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ABSTRACT 
 
IT assets connected on internetwill encounter alien protocols and few parameters of protocol process are 
exposed as vulnerabilities. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are installed to alerton suspicious traffic or 
activity. IDS issuesfalse positives alerts, if any behavior construe for partial attack pattern or the IDS 
lacks environment knowledge. Continuous monitoring of alerts to evolve whether, an alert is false 
positive or not is a major concern. In this paper we present design of an external module to IDS,to 
identify false positive alertsbased on anomaly based adaptive learning model. The novel feature of this 
design is that the system updates behavior profile of assets and environment with adaptive learning 
process.A mixture model is used for behavior modeling from reference data. The design of the detection 
and learning process are based on normal behavior and of environment. The anomaly alert identification 
algorithm isbuiltonSparse Markov Transducers (SMT) based probability.The total process is presented 
using real-time data. The Experimental results are validated and presentedwith reference to lab 
environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Computers and internet have become a part of human life. With availability of Internet 
connectivity everywhere, there is an increase in the number of computers and devices 
connected to the internet. The excess dependence on computers leads to threats and attacks on 
the vulnerabilities in IT setup. To address these challenging threats, security tools like Anti-
viruses, Firewalls, Intrusion Detection / Prevention Systems are deployed.  
 
In the last 30 years, after the first report on Intrusion detection publishedby [Anderson1, 1980), 
Intrusion Detection Systems became an interesting and important subject of study. The concept 
of IDS design is based on the viewpoint that attackers pattern of actions are unusual compared 
to a genuine client. The difference in behavior can be detected. As per [Peng Ning2, 2005] 
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are a subset of preventive security mechanisms and 
deployed along with authentication, access control systems as a subsequent level of protection 
                                                            
1
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to IT Assets. Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systemshave become mandatory security tool to 
monitor systems and detect possible attacks [Debar 3, 1999].  
Most of IT systems and user applications were developed in their respective context without 
security awareness, thereby susceptible to attacks. In the rest of cases, applications and systems 
were developed to operate in one set of environment parameters, deployed in the different setup 
resulting in vulnerability.The vigilant security experts introduce more stringent rules by 
increasing the security thresholds, to reduce false negatives, resulting in high False Positives. 
 
 
 
Figure 1Intrusion Detection System – components 
 
The components of IDS are shown in figure 1. The target system (network) is protected by the 
security policy, which defines legitimate actions(profile) on each entity. The Data captured by 
sensor will be processed by IDS, consist of commands executed by a user, attacker or by an 
application etc. IDS issues alerts, if an intrusion is suspected or detected.Alerts are of two 
categories, intrusion alerts and suspected intrusion alerts.  
 
The main reason for large number of false positivesgenerated by IDS is that IDS classifies an 
event as anomalous, based on the probability threshold of event depending on current 
profile(asset) or rule. The other reason is anomaly-based system may not differentiate 
anomalous behavior of legitimate user actions with intrusive behavior (actions). The objective 
of this work is to address these scenarios and minimize false positives. 
 
The contribution of this paper is in the design of an adaptive external module for real-time 
identification of anomaly in alerts generated by IDS. To attain a linear complexity for detection 
algorithm, the case of Mixture Model is used for behavior modeling and Sparse Markov 
Transducers based algorithm for identification of anomaly in alerts generated. The novel 
Feature is that, the alert is validated with vulnerability on victim system. The experimental 
results are showcased to validate the proposed techniques. In the remainder of this paper, we 
present these findingssuccessively. 
 
2. RELATED WORK  
 
Different approaches to build anomaly detection models have been proposed and implemented 
at design level by many researchers. Statistical Methods are proposed by [Johnson4, 1998] and 
[Roberts5, 1998] for Anomaly Detection, Adaptive, Model-based Monitoring for Cyber Attack 
Detection by [Alfonso6, 2000]. [Stephanie7 3, 1996] used normal sequences for look ahead 
pairs and contiguous sequences. [Sobirey8, 1996] used expert system to collect data from audit 
sources and used it for adaptive intrusion detection. [H S Teng25, 1990] using inductively 
generated sequential patterns, performed adaptive real time anomaly detection. A statistical 
method to determine sequences which occur more frequently in intrusion data as opposed to 
normal data was implemented by [Helman9 5, 1997]. Many anomaly detection techniques 
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models were compared by [Christe10, 1999]. A decision tree applied over the normal data was 
used by [Lee11, 1999]for design of trained prediction model. Neural networks were used to 
model normal data by [Ghosh12,1999]. Model to examine unlabeled data to compare during 
intrusion and normal use for anomaly detection was proposed by [Lane13, 1999]  
 
[Srivastava14, 2006] proposed Database Intrusion Detection using Weighted Sequence Mining. 
[Emmanuel Hooper15 06] designed Intelligent IDS Using Network Quarantine Channels and 
Adaptive Policies and Alert Filters. [Venkatachalam16, 2007]proposed theLAMSTAR neural 
network to learn patterns of normal and intrusive activities and to also classify system 
activities.  [Thoosi17, 2007]proposed IDS based on An Evolutionary Soft computing model 
using Neuro-Fuzzy classifiers.[Victor18, 2008]  proposed a model for Data Mining Approaches 
for Intrusion Detection in Email System. Used data mining technique to discover consistent and 
useful patterns of email system and recognized anomalies.[Chen19, 2008] proposed a 
classification method based on Support Vector Machines (SVM) with a weighted voting 
schema to detect intrusions. [Neelakantan20, 2008] proposed Approach for Obtaining Network-
Specific Useful Alarms. [Ramana Murthy21 09] Incorporated both anomaly and misuse 
detection into the NIDS, to improve Performance of the NIDS. [Rung-Ching22, 2009] “Using 
Rough Set and Supporting Vector Machine for Network Intrusion System to detect 
intrusions.[Subbulakshmi23, 2010] et al proposed “Real Time Classification and Clustering of 
IDS Alerts Using Machine Learning Algorithms”. [Vignesh24, 2010] et al proposed “A Cache 
Oblivious based Genetic Algorithm(GA) Solution for Clustering, for eliminating false positives 
using a parallelized version of Genetic Algorithm”. 
The preparation of behavior profiles to reflect behavior profile of multiple applications running 
on a network with multiple communication protocols is a difficult task. At times, it is difficult 
to identify profiles of present behavior. We modeled this base reference behavior from the 
manual observations of the target network, a representative set of legitimate, non-malicious 
entities (users, services, etc). The add-on module with reference profile was created from 
vulnerability of target network. The anomalies are detected to update the configuration 
(profile), and thereby minimize them. 
Bayesian behavior classification is created manually and used for system training, using 
parametrical mixture model [Cheeseman26]. The mixture model parameters of the EM 
algorithm [Dampster27, 1977], [McLachlan28, 1999] are fitted to accomplish the unsupervised 
learning.The model updates the changes in behavior in last phase of process as learning. The 
design is such that, the model update behavior profile only after re-estimation of 
parameters.The Bayesian techniques used for design of learning, detection and update are 
adopted from the earlier works. The process additional adaptive module to IDS will 
updateknowledge base automatically. 
3. ANOMALY IN ALERT GENERATION MODEL  
The IDS functions as anintrusion detection tool by capturing data related to processes or events 
in target area and analyze them as per the security policy defined by the organization. Intrusion 
activity occurs as a sequence of events. The intrusion activity can be classified into three stages: 
(i) Reconnaissance - Sweeps, automated scans and Port scans 
(ii) Penetration – Ping, Denial of service (DOS) attacks  
(iii) Attack and damage - Compromises the target. 
 
IDS identifies intrusions or suspicious behavior and generate alerts. Suspicious behavior 
identification process depends on characterization of behavior or signature. The alerts generated 
by IDS can be categorized into four types: 
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TP ‘True Positive’, alarm issued on intrusive attempt; 
FP ‘False Positive’, alarm issued on non-intrusive attempt;  
TN ‘True Negative’, no alarm issued and no attempt;  
FN ‘False Negative’, no alarm issued on intrusive attempt. 
 
As per Bayesian model,detection rate Dr of IDS can be computed as   
Dr=     
 
……………………………………….(1) 
The false positive rate Fr can be computed as 
 Fr=     
 ……………………………………….(2) 
 
In the event, IDS does not generate an alarm Dr=0 and therefore the Fr =0; In case, IDS 
generate alarms for all cases, Dr= 1 and Fr= 1, as FN=TN=0; in between IDS can exhibit its 
behavior. The detection rate Dr is proportionate to environment of target area and IDS 
configuration. 
 
Total number of intrusions in a given period of time is sum of the True Positives and False 
Negatives. The total number of non-intrusions is the sum of True Negatives and False Positives. 
Therefore the Base Rate(BR), which is the probability of an attack on target system is number 
of intrusions over the number of events. 
BR =   
 ……………………………………….(3) 
 
The Dr and Fr depend on: 
(i) Design criteria of IDS 
(ii) Environment of target area 
a. Security Policy and configuration 
b. Vulnerability profile on assets 
(iii) The intruder behavior 
 
To build a model to minimize false positives, we propose a probability based algorithm to 
tolerate noises in alert data. The assumption is that non-intrusions (false positives alarms) alerts 
generated by IDS are more compared to intrusions (true positives) alerts. Therefore occurrence 
of actual intrusions is relatively small in number compared with alerts generated by IDS. A 
false positive identification model is devised to separate the intrusions on the target network. 
 
4. MODELING PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS TO IDENTIFY FALSE 
POSITIVES  
 
A probabilistic approach is proposed to examine whether an alert generated is afalse positive or 
a true positive. A mixture model is proposed to model the adaptive learning. Anomaly detection 
techniqueusesSparse Markov Transducers probability distribution. 
 
The assumption is that,the number of true positives (intrusions) may be very small, first it was 
assumed that every alert as a non-intrusion. The probability distribution is used to test each 
element to determine whether it is a non-intrusion or not.Therefore the  model assumes two 
cases for each alert and λ is the probability of true positives (intrusions), while with (1-λ) 
probability alerts corresponds to the non-intrusions (false positives). This motivates a mixture 
model for explaining the presence of false positive alerts. 
 
The framework proposes two probability distributions, a majority (non-intrusion) distributionM 
and minority (intrusions) distributionI. The properties or types of the distributions M and I are 
independent from the framework of mixture model used for explaining the presence of false 
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positives in the alert data. An element is either generated in the majority distribution with 
probability 1-λor from the alternate distribution Iwith probability λ. The distribution for the 
entire alerts data is:  
 
D = (1- λ)M+ λI  ……………………………………….(4) 
 
The framework is to determine which alerts generated by distribution M and which elements 
were generated by the distribution I. Elements generated by I are intrusions (true positives).The 
machine learning method is used to model probability distributions.  
 
We assume that for the non-intrusions, a likelihood function ℒMwhich takes as a parameter, a 
set of non-intrusion elements Mt, and outputs a probability distribution PMt on the data.  
Similarly for intrusions we have likelihood function ℒIand probability distribution PIt. 
 

 = ℒ    …….………………………………….(5) 
 

 = ℒ    ……………………………………….(6) 
 
To identify anomalies in alerts, we have to testelements generated by distribution M or I.For 
each element xt, we have to compute and determine whether it is outlier by comparing the 
likelihood. If determined asintrusion, should be flagged and moved to It+1, else should remain in 
Mt+1as it is false positive alert. 
 
To examine the likelihood of these two cases, we make this determination and the likelihoodℒ 
of the distribution D at time t is: 
 
 = ∏ 
 = 1 − | | ∏ 
 ."#∈ % &| | ∏ 
 ."'∈ ()*+……..(7) 
 
Where, PMtand PItare the probability distributions over the majority and minority (intrusions) 
alerts respectively.  For ease of computation, log likelihood (LL) at a time t is computed. 
 
D = || log1 −  + 2 log
 + || log . ."#∈ + 2 (log
)*
. ."'∈ ………..(8) 
 
We compute whether an element is more likely to be a false positive or a true positive using an 
external module based on the probability.In other words, we examine the change in behavior 
of an activity. 
 
Mt = Mt-1 \ {xt}      …..…………………………………….. 
(9) 
It = It-1∪ {xt}      ………………………..……………….. 
(10) 
 
If this ratio (Lt :Lt-1) or (Lt :Lt-2) or (Lt :Lt+1) is meeting the environment criteria, we declare 
the alert as false positive, It = It-1. Otherwise, the alert remains in normal distributionMt = 
Mt-1. 
 
5. METHODOLOGY    
 
In order to determine whether alert trace subsequence corresponds to an exploit or normal trace, 
we build a probabilistic prediction model which predicts the last (nth) alert /events given the 
previous (n-1) events in the subsequence. In this model, this can be represented as a probability 
estimate of the last events conditional on the sequence of previous events. The size of the 
window and the placement of the wild cards correspond to the length of the conditioning 
sequence and the specific positions in the conditioning sequence on which the probability is 
conditioned. To model this type of probability distribution, we use sparse Markov 
transducers.Sparse Markov Transducers compute probabilistic mappings over sparse data.  
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A Sparse Markov Transducers is defined as a probability distribution on a finite set of inputs. A 
Sparse Markov Transducers of order L is the conditional probability distribution of the form: 
 

4|5 56 57 ….95 
 
Where, Xk are random variables over the input alert vectors Σin and Yk is random variable over 
the output alert Σout. The distribution stochastically defines a mapping from input to output of 
the alerts. We use the Sparse Markov Transducers to model this distribution of order L, which 
is a conditional probability of the form: 

4|∅; ∅;6  6 … ∅;<< 
 
Where, ∅ represents a wild card symbol and = = = − ∑ ?) − @ − 1) . The Sparse Markov 
Transducer estimation algorithm estimates a conditional probability based on a set of inputs and 
their outputs. The priori data set is created manually using the tools. In variable order Markov 
the value of n changes depending on context. Few data elements may use a bigram, while 
others use trigram or n-gram. The Sparse Markov Transducer uses a weighted sum of n-grams 
for different values of n, and the weights depend on the context.  In this context to have low 
complexity, the n is considered as 5. The specific weights of each element depends on the 
context or the actual values of Ci,Tt-2,Tt-1, TtTt+1,Tt+2. Each alert in the weighted sum uses a 
pseudo-count predictor. This predictor computes the probability of output by number of times 
that that specific output was seen in a given context.  
 
The intrusion alerts generated by IDS are independent of any specific probability distribution as 
they are random and sparse. The sequence of the events, activities will be tagged at time t. The 
intrusive behavior can be result of any of the activity at time Tt-2,Tt-1, TtTt+1,Tt+2. Using Sparse 
Markov Transducers Probability model, the alert will be determined to be an element of Mi orIi,. 
The data packets in the window between the Ti-2 alert to the Ti+2alert will be tagged and 
analyzed. The alert vectors are tagged as:  
 
The Common Vulnerability Exposure (CVE) of the alert is Ci 
The alert being examined is Ti 
The next alert Ti+1 
The previous alert Ti-1 
The previous alerts, previous alerts Ti-2 
 
The following parameters are examined from tagged alert vectors: 
 
i. Common Vulnerability  Exposure (CVE) ID (code) of the attack: Common 
Vulnerability Score System (CVSS) of the CVE, Security authorization controls 
impact base line, Source name[BUGTRAQ, OVAL(Open Vulnerability and 
assessment  Language), CISCO, IBM, OSVDB, MS, REDHAT, SUN, SGI  etc] 
ii. IP address of the victim 
iii. Vulnerability on the victim - Vulnerability status on the victim system (Existing | 
Closed) 
iv. Alerts previous activity 
v. Victim system environment 
vi. Connection number, Timestamp, Source IP, Destination IP, Source port, 
Destination port, Protocol, Duration, Source bytes, Destination bytes, TCP Flags, 
Land packet,  
vii. % wrong frag, % urgent, % Resent, % Wrong resent, % Duplicate ACK, % wrong 
data packet size, % data packets, # SYN flags, # RST flags, # FIN flags 
 
The packets in the window Ti-2 to the Ti+2will be analyzed.To decide an alert is true positive or 
false positive, the environment dependent threshold is computed.The tagged data in the window 
is validated by computing the thresholds. This process is repeated for every element and in the 
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end we get a partition of alerts data into two sets, majority elements (false positives) and a set 
of intrusion elements.The computations are as per the Sparse Markov Transducers probability 
distribution.The vulnerability data created will be used for further updation by the learning 
process by adding a recod in that class. Further, the alert is validated with the asset vulnerability 
data to reconfirm respective attack is feasible and possible. 
 
The schematic representation of the process is given below: 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Model for Asset Vulnerabilities compliance to minimize the false positives 
 
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
The work was evaluated on a gigabit network in a campus with online real-time traffic data on 
LAN segment. The IDS is configured on a LAN segment to observe the traffic. The 
environment consists of Snort(Version 2.6) intrusion detection system for obtaining network 
specific alarms, Winpcap(Version 4.0), software sensor to collect the packets to feed the IDS 
and MySql(Version 4.0.25) for storing the data. Retina free download version was used to 
creating the vulnerability database of the target area. 
 
The base knowledgebase was created with major classifications. The first calcification is based 
on of sequences of events. The other is sequence of events linked with the asset and its 
vulnerability. The vulnerability data will be updated as and when the patches are released for 
the retina database. For every sequence of length n, the sequence database will be updated for 
every sequence validated by the system, if the same sequence not exists. 
 
The observed results are indicative of the Knowledgebase was updated with respect to 
environment. 25,592 sequences were examined by the system during the experiment. 9156 
records were updated in knowledgebase for cases of true positives, false positives and false 
negatives. The system identified 1612, 2466, 2372 and 2412 false positive alerts in four equal 
intervals after examining 6879, 7419, 5890 and 5404 sequences (classes) respective intervals. 
Further the system identified and confirmed 369, 563, 708 and 782 alerts as true positives. 
 
The alert data could be classified in to two major categories True positive (TP) and False 
Positive (FP). The probability distribution for the alarms data is not clearly known, hence 
Alert data (Ti-2,Ti-1, 
Ti and Ti+1) 
Mining of 
Knowledge Base 
/ sparse data  
StandardIDS  Not Mapped 
Alert 
False positive 
Alert 
Matched 
vulnerability  
Verify Vulnerability on the 
victim Asset 
Network Traffic 
Knowledge base 
(KB) CVE of alert, 
IP, the Victim 
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Update Knowledge Base (KB) 
in the IDS external Module 
Mapped Alert 
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Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve used for analyze and to visualize two-
dimensional data at their decision threshold levels. It is considered that the real-time data used 
in evaluation is representative of the environment in target area. The accuracy of one set of live 
data varies from its accuracy, at different testing intervals. The experiment was performed in 
four equal intervals.  
 
The ROC curve, illustrate the complete, i.e., two-dimensional accuracy of signal detectors on a 
given data set. The ROC curve gives a sense of how IDS is behaving on a particular 
environment. The ROC curve is starting point for more detailed analyses about expected 
accuracy and cost of detector. 
 
Table1 True Positive, False Positives and base Rate  
 
S 
no 
True 
positive 
False 
Positives  
False 
Negatives 
True 
Negatives 
FP 
Rate 
 TP 
Rate 
Total 
alerts % of FPs 
1 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000   
2 369 1612 70 4828 0.250 0.84 6879 23.43 
3 563 2466 68 4322 0.363 0.89 7419 33.24 
4 708 2372 78 2732 0.465 0.90 5890 40.27 
5 782 2412 78 2132 0.531 0.91 5404 44.63 
 
We use ROC curve to indicate the accuracy of the IDS. The accuracy is revealed in the shape of 
curve, is two-dimensional because there are two kinds of events, and hence two kinds of 
accuracies possible. The first dimension is the success rate (probability of true positives) on y-
axis. The second dimension falsely identifying alarms (probability of false positives) on x-axis. 
If, ROC curve with y-values grow at a faster rate than its x-values, resulting in a curve shape 
which rises swiftly upward is an ideal ROC curve. The decision threshold shall change to be 
more lenient, the x-values must also grow large, catching up with the success values for signals 
(y-values). 
 
IDS accuracy is indicated by the rise or “bowness” of the ROC curve (a). A perfect ROC curve 
passes through the point (0,1) (b)  each point along the ROC curve corresponds to a different 
operating mode, or decision threshold. Points (0,0) indicate exclusive criterion; The more 
accurate curves bulge outward to the upper-left, nearing the point of perfection at (0,1). 
 
 
 
Graph 1 ROC Curve with VDB application First Trail 
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There is slight increase in reduction of false positives because of learning process of the system. 
This experiment was done on the real time data. As the alerts distribution is completely 
independent of the vulnerabilities and environment variables. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
 
The art of detecting intrusions into IT systems is in primitive stage even after 30 years of its 
existence. Even though we are able to address intrusions, IDS generate a large number of false 
positive alarms. IDS made it mandatory for human intervention to validate alarms. Almost all 
work done by the researchers was on reduction of false positives at design level. The current 
work is done on implementation end to assist security administrator. The model with add-on 
module is developed and implemented. The experiments were carried out on real time data. 
Every alarm is examined by an add-on module whether it is a true positive or false positive. 
The use of mixture models implies the assumption of statistical independence between trials, 
which can be restrictive in some cases, hence Stochastic models are considered for 
identification of anomaly.   
 
We have presented a newmodel in identifying anomalies in Alerts generated by IDS, using an 
add-on module to IDS, using a mixture model for behavior modeling and Sparse Markov 
Transducers for detection of anomaly. Continuous model update is accomplished by model 
parameter re-estimation. Algorithms for detection and update phases are designed for real-time 
operations. Our experiments show that proposed algorithms present real-time feasibility with no 
special or additional hardware requirement. Functional validation has been considered for 
intrusion detection in a real-time environment. 
 
The objective is to minimize false positives. The alerts were analyzed and results are presented. 
The observed results are indicative of the environment. The system effectively analyzed and 
identified false positives alarms. The reduction of false was 22.46%, 32.37%, 39.36% and 
43.68% in the first, second, third and fourth weeks, when compared with all alerts. The system 
effectively analyzed and identified 100 % true positives alerts. 
 
The critical evaluation is done on alert using an “Anomaly in alert” and supplemented by 
“vulnerability complianceof the alert with asset” to reinforce verification process is presented. 
The work has established a “framework which enables the administrator to effectively analyze 
alerts”and identify the alarm is a false positive or true positives.From this framework, an 
adaptive module was modeled.  
 
The model is tested with only with one type of vulnerability Bugtraq ID. The intrusions with 
other CVE IDs shall be considered for further stabilization of the system. The proposed system 
has limitation of evaluating only alerts data. The data of alerts only considered for evaluating 
the model, the remaining data to be considered to examine false Negatives. 
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